RIPE NCC
RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTER

Autonomous System Provider Authorisation

ASPA la vista… Route leaks!!!

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Current Routing Security

The Need for Routing security

BGP is based on trust

- Plain-text protocol **without authentication** or encryption
- Any Autonomous System can **announce any prefix**
- Any router can **spoof attributes** like AS path



Internet Routing Registries

Route objects bind prefixes to Autonomous Systems



Internet Routing Registries

Aut-num objects describe the routing policy




```
aut-num:  AS64501
import: from AS64502 accept ANY
export: to AS64502 announce AS64501 AS64503
import: from AS64503 accept AS64503
export: to AS64503 announce ANY
import: from AS64504 accept AS64504
export: to AS64504 announce AS64501 AS64503
```

Internet Routing Registries

The Limits of the IRR system

- Multiple **inconsistent** databases
- Limited **holdership checks**
- Stale data

You download **cleartext data** from **random sources** on the Internet and put them into the configuration of your routers to **make the Internet more secure**.
What could possibly go wrong?



https://irrexplorer.nlnog.net/

Resource Public Key Infrastructure

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

What is RPKI?

- A security framework for the Internet
- Verifies the association between **resource holders** and their **resources**
  - Attaches digital **certificate** to IP addresses and AS numbers
  - Does not contain other information about the holders (no PII)
- Growing list of use cases:
  - **BGP Origin Validation** (BGP OV)
  - **Autonomous System Provider Authorisation** (ASPA)
  - **BGPsec**

RPKI Object Types

	Origin	Path Spoofing	Route Leaks	Deployment
ROA	+	-	-	++
ASPA	-	+/--	+	++/-
BGPsec	-	+	-	-

- ROAs alone protect against mistaken announcements, but not against path issues.
- ROAs and ASPAs protect against mistaken announcements and route leaks. ASPAs do not protect fully against path spoofing, but make it harder.
- ASPA signing is widely available, validation is coming.
- BGPsec (perhaps in future) is complementary and protects against path spoofing, but not *on its own* against leaks.

RPKI in a nutshell

- Resource holders get certificate from their RIRs
  - It contains the list of resources
- Holders can create digitally signed objects:
  - **ROA** for authorizing an Autonomous System to **originate a prefix**
  - **ASPA** for authorising Provider Autonomous Systems
  - **BGPsec** router certificates
- Network operators **use validated data** for **filtering BGP announcements**



RPKI is not just Origin Validation

- Route Origin Validation is the **first and most popular** service of RPKI
- It **prevents misorigination** or **more specific** hijacks
- It does not protect against **AS path spoofing**
- It does not prevent route leaks that **preserve AS path**

Autonomous System Provider Authorisation

Autonomous System Provider Authorisation (ASPA)

ASPA Object

- Object issued by a **holder of a AS number**
- Contains a set of **Provider AS numbers**
- Must be **signed by a RPKI certificate** proving holdership of the client AS number



ASPA

Upstream path validation

- For BGP sessions with **customers** and **peers**
- Simpler and stricter
- Only **up-ramp** is allowed



Downstream path validation

- For BGP sessions with **transit providers**
- Allows **one up-ramp** (to the transit provider) and **one down-ramp** (to your network)



Upstream validation

ASPA Verification - Routes from Customers

Spoofed origin AS

```
Given:
192.0.2.0/24 => AS4
AS4 => [ AS2 ]

AS1 sees 3 5 4 192.0.2.0/24
```

AS1 knows:

- AS3 is a **customer** session - **Upstream validation** is used
- AS5 is "**Not Provider**" for AS4

Therefore this is **invalid**.



ASPA Verification - Routes from Customers

Or.. perhaps just a leak?

```
Given:
192.0.2.0/24 => AS4
AS4 => [ AS2 ]

AS1 sees 3 5 4 192.0.2.0/24
```

AS1 knows:

- AS3 is a **customer** session - **Upstream validation** is used
- AS5 is "**Not Provider**" for AS4

Therefore this is **invalid**.

Note: it does not matter if it's an accidental leak, or malicious spoofing.



Downstream validation

Valley Free Routing - Routes from Providers

Up, to the side and then down



Data should **never flow Up-Down-Up**

ASPA can **detect valleys** in the AS path using the "**Downstream**" validation algorithm

How ASPA Finds Valleys in AS Paths

Downstream Path validation algorithm

1. Each **AS-to-AS hop** is *verified* as:
   a. Provider
   b. Not Provider
   c. No Attestation

2. The longest **Up-ramp** is found starting from the **origin ASN** until a "**Not Provider**" relation is encountered

3. The longest **Down-ramp** is found starting from **local ASN** until a "**Not Provider**" relation is encountered

4. The path is **only plausible if**:
   a. The **Up** and **Down** ramps **meet at adjacent peers**, or
   b. The **Up** and **Down** ramps (partially) **overlap**

5. One or more hops between **Up** and **Down** ramps are **valleys**, such paths are **invalid**

6. If "**No Attestation**" is encountered, the path is **unknown**. Otherwise it is **valid**.

Valley Free Routing

Valley Free Examples



Valley Free Routing

Not Valley Free - Leak by adjacent peer




```
Given:
192.0.2.0/24 => AS5

AS1 => [ AS0 ] # provider free
AS2 => [ AS1 ]
```

```
AS4 sees   1 3 2 5 192.0.2.0/24
```

- AS3 is "Not Provider" for AS2
  Up: 2 5
- AS3 is "Not Provider" for AS1
  Down: 1

AS3 is a valley, therefore this is **invalid**.

Valley Free Routing

Not Valley Free - Leak to second Transit




```
Given:
192.0.2.0/24 => AS6

AS1 => [ AS0 ] # provider free
AS2 => [ AS0 ] # provider free


AS5 sees   2 4 1 3 6 192.0.2.0/24
```

- AS4 is "Not Provider" for AS1
  Up: 1 3 6
- AS4 is "Not Provider" for AS2
  Down: 2

AS4 is a valley, therefore this is **invalid**.

ASPA in the RPKI Dashboard

Overview Page



Manage ASPAs



ASPA configuration options are only shown for the **AS number(s) you hold**

Create / Review ASPAs



You need to check which providers to include, there are **no suggestions**

Which Providers Should Go on Your ASPA Objects?



- **All your providers!**
  - Including **backup ones** even if they are not visible in AS path at the moment
- **Not your lateral peers**
  - Unless those peers that *can* act as your Provider
- Also include **non-transparent route servers of IXP**
  - Otherwise the non-transparent route server AS would be considered a valley
- Make this the part of your **IRR update procedure**

ASPA in the Routers

From Signing to Router



- **Same deployment model** as BGP Origin Validation

ASPA Validation Deployment

It's a sharp tool

- As with **BGP Origin Validation**: reject invalid, do not just lower preference
- Use "**Upstream** Path Validation" for your **customers** and **peers**
- Use "**Downstream** Path Validation" for your **providers**

But it's early days

- Not yet available on many routers, talk to your vendor!
- Probably wise to start by logging
- Warn customers if they **did not include you as a provider**

ASPA Uptake

ASPA Signing Uptake



July 2025

Krill UI (~.BR)

Nov 2025

RIPE NCC UI

Jan 2026

ARIN UI

June 2026

APNIC UI

Oct 2026

ASPA Relative Signing Uptake - 15 August 2026

Region	Registered ASNs
World	2.2%
RIPE NCC	4.6%
NL	6.1%
DE	8.8%
BE	6.5%
GB	5.7%
PL	2.0%
CZ	10.9%

UK - Country Snapshot



Questions & Comments



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